国家土地督察制度的法经济学分析  

Law and Economics Analysis on Land Supervision System

作　　者：梁亚荣[1] 朱新华[2] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学法学院,海南海口570228 [2]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095

出　　处：《河北法学》2009年第3期82-86,共5页Hebei Law Science

基　　金：海南省哲学社会科学2006年规划课题(HNSK06-016);海南省重点学科建设项目课题子课题<海南省岛屿经济法律规制的研究>(xkxm0851-03)

摘　　要：运用法经济学理论分析国家土地督察制度,通过供需分析、成本效益分析、激励分析表明,土地督察制度的供给属于由中央主导创新的供给型供给,其滞后于土地管理需要。由于我国目前还没有解决土地产权、干部考核机制问题,土地督察制度的激励机制缺失。土地督察制度是符合效率原则的,关键在于构建一套制度运行的保障机制。因此,明确界定土地督察权、建立内部激励机制、供给新的后续政策、培育"土地维权"中介组织、进行财税、产权配套改革,应该成为土地督察制度的创新方向。Based on law and economics theory, land supervision system was analyzed with the methods of supply-demand analysis, cost-benefit analysis and stimulation analysis. The results indicate that the supply of land supervision system is the supply-type supply dominated innovation by central government and lags behind the demand of land management. Land supervision system conforms to the efficiency principle. The stimulation mechanism of land supervision system is absent because there are problems coming to settle in land property right and cadre assessment mechanism. Therefore, the innovating direction of land supervision system should include defining land supervision right explicitly, estahlishing internal stimulation mechanism, supplying the new following policies, fostering intermediary organizations which protect the land rights and promoting matching reform of property right, finance and tax.

关 键 词：土地督察制度 法经济学 成本效益 激励 

分 类 号：DF45[政治法律—经济法学]