集体建设用地流转之三方博弈分析——基于地方政府、农村集体组织与用地企业的角度  

Trilateral Game Analysis on Collective Construction Land Transfer:in View of Local Governments,Rural Collectives and Land Using Enterprises

作　　者：袁枫朝[1] 燕新程[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学土地管理系,北京100872 [2]北京市国土资源局,北京100013

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2009年第2期58-63,共6页China Land Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08BJY057);教育部人文社会科学研究博士点基金项目(03JB630006)

摘　　要：研究目的:找出集体建设用地流转的关键所在,为集体建设用地流转制度的创新提供借鉴。研究方法:三方博弈模型。研究结果:地方政府、农村集体组织、用地企业三方博弈均衡结果取决于风险成本、交易成本、收益分成比例等参数的大小;上述参数值的大小受地方政府政策取向的影响。研究结论:土地收益的合理分配是集体建设用地流转的核心,降低交易成本是流转的重点。The purpose of the paper is to find the key of collective construction land transfer and provide reference for institutional innovation of collective construction land transfer. Method of trilateral game model was employed. The results indicate that Nash equilibrium of trilateral game among local governments, rural collectives and enterprises depends on parameters such as the risks cost, the transaction cost and the percentage of land income distribution. These parameters are affected by the tropism of government＇s policies. It is concluded that rational distribution of land income is the core of collective construction land transfer, and to reduce the transaction cost is the emphasis of the transfer.

关 键 词：集体建设用地 流转 博弈 收益 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]