有最低回收量约束的逆向供应链定价策略分析  

Pricing Decisions of Reverse Supply Chains with Minimal Recycled Quantity Limit

作　　者：陈秋双[1] 顾巧论[1,2] 孙国华[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学信息技术学院,天津300071 [2]天津工程师范学院计算机系,天津300222

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2009年第3期35-44,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60274042);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871089)

摘　　要：对由一个制造商和一个回收商组成的二级逆向供应链系统,研究了在对制造商有最低回收量约束情形下的制造商和回收商的定价策略问题,得到了系统的斯坦克尔伯格均衡策略和联合定价策略,并通过数值计算进行了比较分析.For the reverse supply chain that is composed of one manufacturer and one collector （Third Party or Retailer）, the pricing decisions of recycled products are studied by game theory with the limit of minimal recycled quantity. The Stackelberg equilibrium and joint optimal policy of the pricing decisions are obtained. The simulation is conducted to compare the policies.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 博弈论 斯坦克尔伯格均衡 定价策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274