具有产能约束的网络型寡头垄断产业链中企业决策模型研究  

Decision Research of Network Oligopoly Market Industry Chain with Capacity Restraint

作　　者：张凯[1,2] 李向阳[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]哈尔滨工业大学技术.政策.管理(TPM)研究中心,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2009年第1期76-82,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571019;70771031);国家教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060213004);国防科工委基础科研资助项目(A2320060097);哈尔滨工业大学技术.政策.管理国家哲学社会科学创新基地项目

摘　　要：从供应链角度研究产能约束往往忽视了企业间的横向竞合关系,本文构建了Stackelberg博弈模型,通过对下游企业采取的两种不同策略的比较,分析了具有产能约束的网络型寡头垄断产业链中企业的决策问题,并分析了网络外部性及价格歧视对企业决策的影响。研究表明:网络外部性对产业链内所有企业的产量决策产生多种影响,但其最终影响具有不确定性;无论下游企业采取竞争策略还是合谋策略,下游企业的均衡产量均相等且采取竞争策略时获得较大产量,而上游企业在中间产品市场采取价格歧视策略将获得更多的收益。Researchers always omit horizontal co--operation relationships which are from supply chain angle among enterprises. We build a Strackelberg model and analyze the decision research of network oligopoly market industry chain with capacity restraint by comparing two different strategies of downstream enterprises, network externality and price discrimination also have been analyzed in the model. Some conclusions can be drawn： network externality plays an important part in optimal decision of enterprises which are in industry chain, but the sum effect is not sure because of many factors. The optimal production is equal in the downstream enterprises no matter what strategies they choose, enterprises will get much production when they choose competition strategy. Enterprises of upstream will get much more profit when they choose price discrimination.

关 键 词：产业链 生产约束 价格歧视 STACKELBERG模型 

分 类 号：F019.2[经济管理—政治经济学]