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机构地区:[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029
出 处:《中国管理科学》2009年第1期183-192,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571014);新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0159)
摘 要:仅以价格作为确定获胜者的唯一准则已经不能满足许多行业采购拍卖的实际要求。实用中,为确定获胜者,除价格外还需要考虑采购品的其它重要的非价格属性(包括其它的成本型属性和效益型属性),如采购品的质量、交割日期和交割条款等。因此,多属性拍卖理论的发展变得极其重要。由单属性拍卖拓展到多属性拍卖已经引起一系列挑战性的问题。文中介绍了多属性采购拍卖的应用领域和需要研究的理论问题;把多属性采购拍卖分为两类(博弈论模型和决策论模型),并对相关文献的建模假设、主要思想和结论进行回顾和评述。Procurement auctions in which the winner is determined based on the sole price criterion have not satisfied the procurement requirements for many industries in the real world. Practically, to select the winner, in addition to the price, other important non-price attributes of the procured objects (including other cost attributes and benefit attributes) are often considered, such as quality, delivery time, and delivery terms and conditions. Thus, studies on multi-attribute auction theory become crucial. However, extension from traditional auctions to multi-attribute auctions has given rise to a series of challenge prohlems. In this paper, widespread applications and theoretical problems of multi-attribute auctions are presented. The multi-attribute auction models are divided into two groups (i. e. , game-theoretical and decision-theoretical models). Assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to the two groups of models are reviewed and commented .
分 类 号:F016[经济管理—政治经济学]
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