关于铁路春运价格制订的博弈分析  

Gaming Theory Analysis on Railway Price Management in Spring Transportation

作　　者：高金田[1] 孟昭曦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《北方经贸》2009年第1期54-57,共4页Northern Economy and Trade

摘　　要：用博弈论方法对铁路票价制定和消费者购买行为进行经济学分析,铁路票价制定有其利益趋向依据。而2007年以后春运期间火车票不再涨价,也是铁路部门与广大群众、新闻媒体、政府各方博弈的结果。This article analyses how the price of railway tickets is fixed according to customers＇ activities by using gaming theory. And it demonstrates that the level which railway ticket price is settled has interest tendency. The changeless of railway ticket price during spring transportation after 2007 was the final result of the gaming process by railway department, customers, media and government.

关 键 词：春运 价格制定 博弈分析 价格歧视 

分 类 号：F532[经济管理—产业经济]