不同回收法律下的再制造供应链决策与合作研究  

Optimal Decisions and Coordination Contract in a Supply Chain with Remanufacturing under Different Take-back Laws

作　　者：汪翼[1,2] 孙林岩[1,2] 杨洪焦[1,2] 李刚[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室,西安710049

出　　处：《管理科学》2009年第1期2-8,共7页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70433003;70701029)~~

摘　　要：研究制造商责任制和分销商责任制两种回收法律体系对制造商和分销商的影响。针对不同法律体系下的供应链决策建立制造商作为斯塔伯格领先者的模型,研究这些回收法律下供应链成员的决策和收益。结果表明,不同的回收法律对供应链的总绩效不会产生影响,但是会通过回收可变费用影响收益在供应链成员之间的分配。此外,针对分散决策效率的不足,设计了在分销商责任制法律下基于回收品价格的价格折扣与回收补偿相结合的合作机制,促使供应链成员合作以使供应链总收益达到集中决策时的收益。This paper studied the impact of two different take-back laws to the manufacturer and the distributor： manufacturer responsibility law and distributor responsibility law. Considering supply chains under manufacturer responsibility law and distributor responsibility law, it makes a model which takes manufacturer as Stackelberg leader to analyze all members＇decisions and expected profits. The findings showed that different take-back laws have the same effect on supply chain＇s total performance, while do affect the share of profits attributed to in supply chain members through the variable costs on take-back. Then, given the ineffi- cient scattered decision-making, and under the distributor responsibility law, we developed a mechanism combining the return price-dependent discount with a compensation contract to coordinate the manufacturer and the distributor. Under this mechanism, the supply chain will make a profit as in centralized supply chain.

关 键 词：再制造供应链 回收法律 博弈论 价格折扣机制 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]