论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应  

Research on Price,Sales and Welfare effects of Collective Bargaining Power of Strategic Procurement-coalition

作　　者：王根蓓[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2009年第3期57-67,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目资助(06BJL054);上海财经大学211第三期项目资助

摘　　要：文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Cournot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题。文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响。Based on outsourcing services in manufacturing industry, the paper develops a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash bargaining model concerning on collective bargaining between strategic procurement-coalition of the host country and foreign monopolistic supplier. It discusses the issues about whether to establish the strategic procurement-coalition and bow to conduct the collective bargaining power to reduce cost and guarantee supply. This paper shows that trade complementarity between the host country and foreign countries justifies the necessity and urgency of procurement-coalition, and makes the price, sales and welfare effects of collective bargaining power more complex. These effects depend on the preferences of strategic procurement-coalition of the host country, and external objective factors, such as the price elasticity of demand curve of the final product and the technology and production specialization levels of foreign enterprises. Among them, the preference of strategic procurement-coalition plays a dominant role.

关 键 词：策略性采购联盟 联盟偏好 集体谈判力 互补性贸易 价格 销量与福利效应 

分 类 号：F740.41[经济管理—国际贸易]