控股股东代理的激励与侵占效应分析  

Controlling Shareholders Agency: Analysis of Incentive and Entrenchment Effects

作　　者：宋小保[1,2] 刘星[2] 陈其安[2] 

机构地区：[1]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第1期53-58,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100)

摘　　要：控股股东与中小股东、债权人的代理冲突已经成为公司治理中代理问题的核心,而且也有相关文献实证分析了控股股东对企业绩效和企业价值的影响,但精确的定量理论分析仍较为缺乏。本文通过建立实物期权模型,理论研究了控股股东代理对企业投资政策选择和企业价值的影响。研究结果表明,随着控股股东现金流权的增加,企业价值增加,证明了控股股东存在正向的激励效应;随着控股股东控制权和现金流权分离程度的加大,企业价值迅速降低,投资提前,该结论证明了控股股东具有负的侵占效应。The agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and creditors has been becoming the core of agency problems in corporate governance.The effects of controlling shareholders on corporate valuation have been researched empirically in some papers,but the quantitative theoretic analysis is scarce yet.Real options model of investment is built in this paper,through which the effect of controlling shareholders on investment policy and corporate valuation was analyzed.Analysis result shows that with the increase of cash flow right of controlling shareholders,corporate valuation increase,which testifies the incentive effects.With the increase of separation of cash flow right and control right,corporate valuation reduces,invests more early,which testifies the entrenchment effects of controlling shareholders.

关 键 词：控股股东 激励效应 侵占效应 实物期权 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]