两期不确定性需求下的供应链供需博弈  

Game of Supply Chain Members under Two-period Correlated and Uncertain Demand

作　　者：李娟[1] 黄培清[1] 顾锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第1期99-103,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802041;70772065;70732003)

摘　　要：由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的系统,系统成员进行两期博弈,每期初,零售商订购,每期末,销售剩余产品剩余价值为零;零售商所面临的两期不确定性需求相关或不相关,当两期需求相关时,系统成员可以通过第一期销售情况更新第二期不确定性需求的分布。基于此模型,首先,探讨了供应商提供的回购合同的条件以及最优的回购合同参数。其次,通过数值模拟计算,得出零售商和供应链系统偏好于采用更新信息,增加收益,而供应商获取更多的更新信息使得自身收益减少。最后,若在不确定性需求相关下,供应商愿意提供回购合同,那么在不确定性需求不相关下,供应商也愿意提供回购合同,还指出,学习不确定性需求分布最佳的方式是通过回购合同,而不是批发价格合同。There is a supply chain comprised of one supply and one retailer,the members of supply chain game in two periods,at the beginning of each period the retailer orders,at the end of each period the salvage value of remained products is zero.The model assumes that demand are uncertain but correlated/non-correlated across two periods,its distribution function can be updated over time via the realization of sales when two periods demand are correlated.In such environments,firstly,the condition of buyback contracts existing is analyzed,and the premium contracts parameters are given.Secondly,numerical analysis is used to analyze the decentralized supply chain,the retailer and the supply chain system are prefer to acquire information updating to increase its profit,on the other hand,the supplier is decline to receive information updating because of profit decreasing.At last,the supplier is more willing to provide buybacks contracts under correlated demand than non-correlated demand,and buyback contracts may be a better way for the supplier to learn the demand of a new product than wholesale prices.

关 键 词：两期供应链 回购合同 信息更新 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]