信息不对称视角下的医疗供方诱导需求探析  

The Analysis on Medical Supplier-Induced Demand from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry

作　　者：王章佩[1] 林闽钢[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《医学与哲学（A）》2009年第3期54-56,共3页Medicine & Philosophy:Humanistic & Social Medicine Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目"中国农村合作医疗制度建设研究";项目编号:07BSH068

摘　　要：从信息不对称视角来审视供方诱导行为,其约束机制的重心应该放在扭转供方与监管方的信息结构上,打破两者之间的信息不对称。农村医疗保险中的"江阴模式"进行了一系列的制度和技术创新,直接约束了供方诱导需求等不道德行为,并为有效地平衡三者之间的信息结构奠定了基础。From the perspective of information asymmetry, we should find it is not easy to transfer the information advantage over demand party. However,there is much lower-cost way to balance the information between the supplier and the supervisor. The JiangYin model has given a valuable case on the control of supplier-induced demand and the balance of information among medical supplier, demand party and supervisor.

关 键 词：供方诱导需求 信息不对称 江阴模式 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]