收益共享对供应链的影响  

Studies on the Impacts of Revenue Sharing in a Supply Chain

作　　者：许传永[1] 苟清龙[1] 周垂日[1] 梁樑[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥230026

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2009年第1期7-13,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371023;70821001);国家教育部博士点基金资助项目(20030358052)

摘　　要：研究了单个供应商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,在需求不确定的情况下,零售商采用收益共享机制对供应链的影响。采用Stackelberg博弈模型分析得到了零售商和供应商的最优决策,并进一步探讨了对供应链的订货水平、利润和利润分配的影响。发现收益共享对于零售商来说,可以提高利润但降低了利润份额,对供应商更有利,追求更高利润份额的动机也会造成供应链失调和效率降低。This paper studies the impacts of revenue sharing in a supply chain in which a supplier sells a single product to a retailer who faces uncertain demand. By modeling the interaction between the supplier and the retailer as a Stackelberg game the optimal decisions of both parties are obtained. Further analysis of the impacts on order quantity, profit and profit allocation is performed. This paper shows that under revenue sharing the retailer＇s profit is increased but profit share is decreased. Revenue sharing benefits supplier mostly. Pursuing greater profit share is another important reason for supply chain misalignments.

关 键 词：收益共享 STACKELBERG博弈 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]