我国农村扶贫的制度性陷阱与制度创新  

Institutional Trap and Institutional Innovation of Rural Poverty Reduction in China

作　　者：徐孝勇[1] 赖景生[2] 寸家菊[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400047 [2]重庆工商大学经济贸易学院,重庆400067 [3]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《农业现代化研究》2009年第2期184-188,共5页Research of Agricultural Modernization

基　　金：国家社科基金项目<对西部若干国家级贫困县的调查研究及对策建议>(编号:04XJY028)

摘　　要：本文在从博弈理论和农民的权利贫困角度,分析我国农村扶贫的制度性陷阱生成机理的基础上,提出了开展农村扶贫制度创新和构建"市场+政府+民主协商"准市场化农村扶贫资源配置机制等,打破我国农村扶贫的制度性陷阱和推进农村扶贫事业发展的对策及措施。This paper analyses the creating mechanism of the institutional trap of rural poverty reduction from the aspect of the game theory and the peasant poverty of right. This paper provides many suggestions such as institutional innovation of rural poverty reduction and constructing a quasi-market mechanism of resource allocation of ＂government, market and democracy＂ to break through the institution trap of rural poverty reduction to promote the project of rural antipoverty in China.

关 键 词：农村扶贫 制度性陷阱 权利贫困 制度创新 

分 类 号：F323.8[经济管理—产业经济]