基于收益共享合同的虚拟企业控制权力分配  

Control rights allocation in virtual enterprises based on revenue sharing

作　　者：陈剑[1] 陈剑锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第3期447-451,共5页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(70621061)

摘　　要：虚拟企业是多个拥有不同核心能力的企业为了某稍纵即逝的市场机遇而临时组合到一起的一个团队。市场机遇的不确定性、复杂性以及运作过程中存在的信息不对称以及由此产生的道德风险问题,都导致了虚拟企业初始合同的不完备性。控制权力如何分配显得尤为重要,因为拥有控制权的伙伴企业的行为选择有可能偏离甚至损害虚拟企业的整体利益。该文以两个伙伴企业组成的虚拟企业为研究对象,在收益共享合同的基础上建立了一个理论框架来讨论控制权力的分配问题。研究结果表明:为了保证投资激励必须通过控制权力和收益权在2个伙伴企业之间的合理配置来平衡双方的谈判能力;当获取私利的可能性较小时,收益分配份额较大的伙伴企业单方控制是最优的权力配置;而当获取私利的可能性很大时,共享控制权力可能是更优的选择。A virtual enterprise is a team composed of several enterprises with different core competences driven by some transient market opportunity. The uncertainty and complexity of the market opportunity, the asymmetric information, and the resulting moral hazard problem lead to incomplete contracts in virtual enterprises. Consequently, the control rights must be carefully allocated, since the parmer＇s behavior will be influenced by his control rights, perhaps even damaging the virtual enterprisers overall interests. This research develops a theoretical framework based on the revenue sharing contracts of control rights allocation between two partners in a virtual enterprise. The results show that the control rights and revenue sharing rights must be rationally allocated to balance the partners＇ negotiation ability and ensure their investment incentives. Majority control is the optimal allocation if the probability of acquiring private benefits is relatively small, while shared control may be better if the probability is relatively large.

关 键 词：虚拟企业 控制权 收益共享 不完备合约 

分 类 号：F715.4[经济管理—产业经济]