易腐性产品运输设施选择博弈  

Transportation facility choice game of perishable products

作　　者：李军[1] 蔡小强[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031 [2]香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理系

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第1期28-37,共10页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471039);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-04-0886);国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY038);西南交通大学"扬华之星"人才计划项目

摘　　要：易腐性产品的价值会随着时间的流逝而逐渐损失,多个客户可以联合使用某种运输设施时,如何对费用进行公平且稳定的分摊是合作能否进行的基础.把易腐性产品的损失价值和运输费用之和作为总费用,进而将易腐性产品的运输设施选择的费用分配问题构造成运输设施选择合作博弈,证明了在易腐性产品负指数价值损失的情况下,运输设施选择博弈的核心非空,且为凹博弈,并讨论了解的特征.论文还证明具有附加运输费用的运输设施选择博弈的核心非空,分析了核心与线性规划松弛的对偶最优解之间的关系.论文对有约束设施选择博弈进行了分析,并提出了进一步研究的方向.The values of perishable products decay as time passes. If the total costs can be allocated fairly or stably among customers, there is an incentive to cooperate for different customers. Considering the transportation cost and decay value, the cost allocation problem is formulated as a transportation facility choice game. It is proved that the choice game has a non-empty core and also concave in case of negative exponential decay function. The characteristics of some solutions are analyzed. It is shown that the choice game with additional transportation cost has a non-empty core. The relation is discussed between the core and the dual of the linear programming relaxation. Finally the choice game with constraints are discussed, and further research areas are presented.

关 键 词：易腐性产品 运输设施选择博弈 负指数损失函数 凹博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]