股权结构、公司治理对股权代理成本的影响——基于中国上市公司2001～2006年数据的研究  

Ownership Structure,Corporate Governance and Agency Cost of Equity

作　　者：李明辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院会计学系,江苏南京市210093

出　　处：《金融研究》2009年第2期149-168,共20页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：笔者主持的2006年度国家社科基金项目"公司治理全球趋同研究"(批准号:06BJY058)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文利用我国上市公司2001～2006年的数据,检验了股权结构和公司治理因素对股权代理成本的影响。结果发现,股权集中有助于降低股权代理成本;当采用管理费用率衡量代理成本时,管理层持股比例与股权代理成本呈U形关系,但若采用资产周转率衡量股权代理成本,这一关系则不够显著;文章还发现,勤勉的监事会、董事会独立性的提高、董事长和总经理两职部分分离可在一定程度上降低代理成本,国有控股公司的在职消费较高但其资产使用效率也更高。Based on the data of Chinese listed companies among 2001 - 2006, this paper explores the influence of ownership structure and corporate governance on the agency cost of equity. The result shows that concentrated ownership can decrease agency cost of equity. There＇s a U relationship between managerial ownership and the agency cost of equity when the agency cost is measured by management expenditure ratio, but the relationship is not significant when the agency cost is measured by asset utilization efficiency. The result also shows that diligent supervisory board, more independent board and the semi-separate status between CEO and chairman of the Board could decrease agency cost to some extent, and, the asset utilization ratio of state-owned firms may be higher than other firms although its managerial non-pecuniary benefits also be higher.

关 键 词：股权代理成本 股权结构 公司治理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F276.6