考虑随机需求的供应链合作广告与存货策略  

Cooperative Advertising and Stocking Strategies for Supply Chains with Stochastic Demands

作　　者：曹桂梅[1] 熊中楷[1] 曾顺秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《工业工程》2009年第1期34-40,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(02cjy027);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571088)

摘　　要：基于单一制造商与单一零售商所组成的渠道结构,放宽了市场需求为确定性的假设,引入了存货因子这一决策变量,先后考察了Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈时制造商与零售商的最优广告策略及零售商的最优存货策略,比较了不同博弈结构下的均衡策略及相应期望利润,并利用Nash讨价还价模型对合作利润进行了分配。通过一个数学算例验证了有关结论。For marketing channels consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper relaxes the control that market demands are certain, uses a decision variable of stocking factor, investigates the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇ s optimal advertising strategies and the retailer＇ s optimal stocking strategies when Stackelberg leader-follower game and Nash cooperative game are played. Equilibrium strategies and correspondent profits are compared between the two games. Nash bargaining model is employed to divide cooperative profits.

关 键 词：供应链 合作广告 存货 博弈 讨价还价 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]