中国大学治理:激励、承诺与约束  

University Governance in China:Incentive,Commitment and Constraint

作　　者：郭广珍[1] 佟健[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学比较经济体制研究中心,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报（高等教育版）》2009年第1期1-6,共6页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部重点研究基地重点研究项目(项目批号:07JJD790153);辽宁省教育厅文科基地项目(项目批号:2008JD39)

摘　　要：如何激励大学内部行为人的问题在当前颇受关注,一般认为多任务的激励模型可以提供一个解释。然而,在论证了大学任务具有不可验证性后,模型的分析结果表明,最优的激励方式应该是低激励,或者是不激励的。也就是说,按照这一结论,中国大部分关于激励大学人员的理论建议和现实政策都是徒劳的,甚至是起负作用的。因此,笔者借鉴交易成本政治学的思想,认为当对大学不能实行强激励机制时,承诺和约束机制则变得非常重要。At present, the issues of how to motivate the behavior in the university has attracted a lot of attention in China. It is generally believed that the multi- task incentive model can provide an explanation. However, after having proved the task in the university can not be verified, the model shows that the best way of incentives should be low or no incentives. That is, according to this conclusion, most of the theory advice and practical policy of staff incentives in Chinese university is futile, even causes the negative effects. Therefore, borrowing the ideas from the transaction cost politics, the authors believe that when the strong incentive mechanism cannot be implemented in the university, commitment and constraint mechanism becomes important.

关 键 词：大学 多任务模型 激励理论 交易成本政治学 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]