渠道势力、纵向压榨与过度投资  

The Channel Power,Vertical Squeeze and Overinvestment

作　　者：黄亦然[1] 周勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学产业经济研究中心,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2009年第2期25-32,共8页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划项目"开放条件下中国制造业与外资零售业纵向关系研究"(项目编号:05JA790010);国家社会科学基金"中国产业安全链重构:突破跨国‘链主’纵向控制的理论和对策研究"(项目编号:08BJY086)的支持

摘　　要：本文从纵向关系的视角出发，通过建立产业间投资决策权衡模型，对零售业压榨制造业利润的问题进行了全新的研究。本文采用1995年～2005年中国18个轻工制造业与零售业盈利影响因素面板数据进行分析发现，零售业存在利用渠道势力对制造业利润进行纵向压榨的现象，且这种优势有被滥用从而使零售业自身陷入过度投资的陷阱；与国外先进制造业相比，中国制造业整体表现出技术水平不高、盈利手段局限于简单的规模扩张。This paper proposes a tradeoff model for industry investment decision-making and investigates the vertical squeeze phenomenon between retailing and manufacturing from the viewpoint of vertical relationship. A panel data contains the factors impacting 18 light manufacturing and retailing＇s earnings was used to verify the model. We find that channel power was capitalized by retailing to execute vertical squeeze against manufacturing, this abuse of channel power is inducing the retailing fall into an overinvest trap. The evidence also suggests that increasing investment is the only way for manufacturing to maintain its profit, the technical level of Chinese manufacturing is so low that scale expansion was the barely instrument to keep profitable.

关 键 词：零售业 制造业 渠道势力 纵向压榨 过度投资 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济] F713.1