技术溢出与最优R＆D补贴策略  

Technological spillovers and optimal R&D subsidy policy

作　　者：刘卫民[1] 陈继祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2009年第2期208-210,共3页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371043)

摘　　要：针对R&D补贴对私人创新的激励问题,按照R&D和产量博弈的合作情况,将双寡头企业分为三种组织类型.最优R&D补贴率总是随着技术溢出的增加而增加.通过R&D补贴,完全不合作与半合作可以获得相同结果,而且当技术成果完全共享时,成本降低幅度达到最大值.从利润最大化角度,企业愿意完全合作,但是这将导致社会福利水平最低.Aimed at the effect of R＆D subsidy on private innovation, three types of organizations are introduced according to the relationship of the duopoly in R＆D and output game. The optimal subsidy is always increasing with the technology spillover. The subsidy leads to the same result in non - cooperation R＆D and half - cooperation R＆D. If innovation is shared completely, the cost reduction reaches the maximum. Firms would like to select full - cooperation, while this will result in the lowest social welfare.

关 键 词：研究与发展 补贴 技术溢出 合作 竞争 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]