易腐产品冷藏供应链博弈模型  

Game model of cold chain for a deteriorating item

作　　者：董骏峰[1] 梁樑[1] 邱昊[2] 杜少甫[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]中国建设银行安徽省分行,安徽合肥230001

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2009年第3期278-287,共10页JUSTC

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70525001)资助

摘　　要：将易腐产品的库存管理拓展到冷藏供应链系统中,通过对两阶段分布式冷藏链系统的分析,得到了生产商和销售商在价格和储存温度上的最优决策.运用博弈方法研究了上下游企业在库存温度决策时的相互影响,并证明了当市场需求的价格灵敏度在一定范围内时,销售商库存温度的变化对零售价格的影响要大于生产商,同时也证明纳什均衡的存在性.最后算例表明冷藏供应链中上下游企业在易腐产品冷藏储存方面的合作可以有效提高系统收益,但是当易腐产品性质不一致时销售商和生产商对采用合作方式的主动性会有所区别.The research on deteriorating items was extended to the cold chain system. By analyzing a twoechelon distributed supply chain, the optimal price and temperature policy was obtained. Game approach was employed to discuss the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the existence of Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. The results show that the sale price is more sensitive to the manufacturer＇s warehouse temperature when the price-sensitivity of customers is in a certain range. Finally, a numerical example was given to illustrate that the cooperation in temperature control can impressively increase the system＇s profit, but the motivation to cooperate for the manufacturer and the retailer is different if the deteriorating item is under different temperature sensitivities.

关 键 词：易腐产品 冷藏供应链 纳什博弈 温度 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]