基于博弈的我国生产者延伸责任制度运行环境研究  

Study of implementing environments of extended producer responsibility in China based on game analysis

作　　者：赵一平[1] 朱庆华[1] 武春友[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报》2009年第2期294-298,共5页Journal of Dalian University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772085);辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L07CJL026);大连理工大学人文社科研究基金资助项目(重点项目DUTHS2008201)

摘　　要：为促进我国生产者延伸责任制(extended producer responsibility,简称EPR)的有效实施,重点研究了EPR实施过程中政府与企业的核心作用,分析了二者间博弈和策略寻优过程对实施EPR的影响,构建了两主体完全信息静态EPR博弈模型.通过对博弈的短期收益与长期收益的交叉分析,识别出政府实施EPR的成本、对企业不承担责任的惩罚、企业承担责任的成本、不承担责任受到惩罚或潜在收益、企业形象价值以及国际合作与国际市场开发等因素是影响EPR构建与实施的关键因素.据此,结合我国国情,剖析了我国现阶段实施EPR的运行环境特点,为政府部门以及相关行业企业提出对策建议.In order to promote the successful implementation of extended producer responsibility （EPR） in China, the role of government and core producers during EPR is emphasized. Game and strategy optimizing process between government and producer are studied. Static two-entity EPR game model under complete information is proposed. By crossly analyzing the expected benefits in both short-term and long-term, six key affecting factors are identified including cost of government＇s implementing EPR, punishment for violations, cost for producer to take responsibilities, potential benefits to violate the regulations, eco-image value for producer, and the international market development and promotion. Based on discussion of the influences of the above factors, functioning environment of implementing EPR in China is further studied based on the local environment in China. Suggestions are given accordingly in the end.

关 键 词：生产者延伸责任制 博弈 运行主体 运行环境 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济] F4