基于博弈论的确定性电量分解合作联盟稳定性分析  

Stability Analysis of Deterministic Contract Decomposition Coalition Based on Game Theory

作　　者：陈建华[1] 张宁[2] 戴铁潮[2] 叶炯[2] 卢永[1] 甘德强[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学电气工程学院,浙江省杭州市310027 [2]浙江省电力公司,浙江省杭州市310007

出　　处：《电网技术》2009年第7期83-89,共7页Power System Technology

摘　　要：从合同博弈角度出发,考察用单位电量净收益计算单一购买者和发电厂商的效用,分析了单一购买者和发电厂商愿意参与合同分解形成联盟的理论条件:当仅有一个发电厂商时,若双方均为风险厌恶型则联盟稳定,双方均为风险喜好型则联盟不稳定;当有一个购电公司、多个发电厂商时,需满足多个不等式条件联盟才稳定。用国内某省级市场的实际数据进行仿真分析,结果表明建立的模型合理有效。From the viewpoint of cooperative game, per unit net revenue is adopted to evaluate single buyer and generators＇ utility, the conditions under which the generators and buyers are willing to participate in contract decomposition are conducted. In a single-buyer- single-supplier market, if both parties are risk-averse, the coalition is always stable; if both parties are risk-adventurous, the coalition is always unstable. In a single-buyer-multi-supplier market, the coalition can just be conditionally stable unless multi inequality conditions are satisfied. Results of the simulation based on the practical data of a certain provincial electricity market show that the built model is rational and effective.

关 键 词：电力市场 合同分解 效用 合作博弈 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]