考虑网络约束的需求侧最优竞价策略  

Bidding strategy equilibrium of demand side in electricity market with transmission constrains

作　　者：王蓓蓓[1] 窦迅[2] 李扬[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学电气工程学院,江苏南京210096 [2]南京工业大学自动化与电气工程学院,江苏南京210009

出　　处：《电力自动化设备》2009年第4期15-20,26,共7页Electric Power Automation Equipment

摘　　要：在电力市场环境下,市场竞争带来的潮流运行方式的随机性、多变性和不可预测性与输电网的潮流约束、安全约束相互矛盾而又同时存在,从需求侧角度考虑,针对Pool模式电力市场中需求侧各购电成员之间利润分配的非合作博弈均衡问题,提出了多个需求侧购电成员如何优化自己的购电竞价策略而使所有购电者均达到收益最大化的2层优化模型,考虑了电力网络约束对购电成员收益的影响,针对此均衡约束数学规划问题提出了一种求解多个需求侧购电成员处于纳什均衡点的最优策略解析方法,同时还提供了从备选策略集合中找到纯纳什均衡解的方法,在此基础上,以IEEE 30节点系统为例说明需求侧采用购电策略报价对发电商收益、需求侧各自收益及对电力市场运行的影响。In electricity market, the operational mode randomicity, variability and unpredictability of power flow coexist with the power flow constraint and safety constraint. A dual-level optimization model to maximize the benefit of each buyer in the Pool electricity market is presented, which equilibrates the bidding strategies among multiple buyers. The network constrains are considered and a mathematic approach to the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints is developed. All hypothesis Nash Equilibriums are validated to get the pure strategic Nash Equilibrium. With IEEE 30-bus test system as an example, the influence of demand side bidding strategy on the supply side benefit, the demand side benefit and the power market operation are analyzed.

关 键 词：电力市场 2层优化 网络约束 需求侧购电策略 非合作博弈 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]