跨国零售买方势力的福利影响与规制思路--以通道费为例的模型分析  

Welfare Effects and Regulation Method of Buyer Power from Multinational Retailers—A Theoretical Model of Slotting Allowance

作　　者：庄尚文[1] 赵亚平[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院流通经济学专业博士研究生,100872 [2]北京联合大学商务学院国际经济研究所所长、教授,100025

出　　处：《财贸经济》2009年第3期113-118,共6页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：2008北京市属高等学校人才强教计划资助项目:“跨国零售在华垄断势力及其规制问题研究”阶段性成果;国家自然科学基金项目《流通主导型渠道的生成机理及其效率促进机制研究》(项目批准号:70772009)资助。

摘　　要：收取通道费是跨国零售行使买方势力的典型方式。本文将供应商区分为差异化产品生产者和同质产品生产者,结合双边市场的理论和模型研究,将零售商的服务纳入到模型分析,并将其内生化,以此为基础分析了零售商收取的差别化通道费对消费者福利的影响。结论表明,零售商对差异化产品收取通道费对其均衡价格没有影响,但是可以提高零售商的服务水平和降低同质产品的均衡价格,因而有利于增进消费者福利;但是,零售商对同质产品收取通道费会带来消费者福利的下降。据此提出了通道费的规制建议,并提出了关于跨国零售买方势力的规制思路。Slotting allowance is the typical expression of buyer power from multinational retailers.This paper splits suppliers into differentiated product manufacturer and homogenous product manufactures, introduces retailers'service into the model and makes it endogenously with the theory of two-sided markets.Then the paper analyzes the impact of differentiated slotting allowance on the consumer welfare.The paper concludes that the slotting allowance with differentiated product has no effect on the equilibrium price,but can enhance the level of retailers'services and decrease the equilibrium price of homogenous product and thus be benefit for the consumer welfare;however, the slotting allowance with homogenous product will reduce the consumer welfare.Based on the conclusion,the authors put forward with some suggestions for the regulation of slotting allowance.Finally,the authors give the regulation method for the buyer power from multinational retailers generally in terms of the analysis on the slotting allowance.

关 键 词：跨国零售 买方势力 通道费 福利规制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F717.6