用免疫法维持长期的互惠合作  

Keep a Long-term Reciprocity Cooperation Using an Immunity Method

作　　者：孙振武[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海电机学院应用数理研究所,上海200240

出　　处：《上海电机学院学报》2009年第1期69-72,共4页Journal of Shanghai Dianji University

摘　　要：为寻找到使博弈长期维持在合作状态的方法,分别利用计算机"Dynamo"演化软件和复制子动力学机理对直接互惠博弈演化进行了模拟和理论讨论。结果显示,当博弈重复的几率小于付出收益率时,合作是不可能达到的;反之,当博弈重复几率大于付出收益率且博弈演化到没有防守策略存在时,加入少量防守策略对博弈进行干扰,可使其长期维持合作状态。Cooperation is the foundation of the survive and development of biological organization and human society. The evolution of direct reciprocity game is simulated with ＂Dynamo＂ evolvement program and discussed in replicator dynamics theory respectively, so that the way of keeping games in the long-term cooperation can be found out. It is shown that cooperation cannot be achieved if the repetition probability of a game is less than the ratio of cost to payoff. Otherwise reciprocity cooperation can be kept for a long time in an immunity way, in which a small number of defection strategies are added to interfere when the defection strategy doesn＇t exist.

关 键 词：合作 直接互惠 免疫法 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]