OPTIMAL SUBSTRUCTURE OF SET-VALUED SOLUTIONS OF NORMAL-FORM GAMES AND COORDINATION  

作　　者：Norimasa KOBAYASHI Kyoichi KIJIMA 

机构地区：[1]Department of Value and Decision Science.Tokyo Institutc of Technology

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2009年第1期63-76,共14页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

摘　　要：A number of solution concepts of normal-form games have been proposed in the literature on subspaces of action profiles that have Nash type stability. While the literature mainly focuses oil the minimal of such stable subspaces, this paper argues that non-minimal stable subspaces represent well the multi-agent situations to which neither Nash equilibrium nor rationalizability may be applied with satisfaction. As a theoretical support, the authors prove the optimal substructure of stable subspaces regarding the restriction of a game. It is further argued that the optimal substructure characterizes hierarchical diversity of coordination and interim phases in learning.

关 键 词：COORDINATION curb set learning Nash equilibrium optimal substructure prep set RATIONALIZABILITY restriction retract. 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]