基金市场监管的进化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Fund Market

作　　者：胡子康[1] 朱涛[1] 王永县[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2009年第7期64-69,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金会创新研究群体科学基金(70621061)

摘　　要：通过对基金市场中基金管理者和市场监管者的行为分析,引入有限理性博弈概念,建立了一个基金市场监管的动态博弈模型,并应用进化博弈方法在模型求解和参数分析的基础提出了相关政策建议:1)市场监管的比例应稍超过某个临界值则可达到最优;2)应降低基金管理者对市场监管要求的临界值;3)应关注监管者对市场中违规基金数量比例预期的临界值,并适时的调整监管力度使得基金群体中违规的比例趋向于最小.This paper introduces the concept of bounded rationality game theory and establishes a game theory model on the supervision of fund market. Using the method of evolutionary game theory, this paper explores possible solutions to the model and conducts variable analysis correspondingly. In the end, normative research results and suggestions are given regarding policy-making in fund market supervision. First, we may designate the percentage of market supervision at a marginally higher level than the threshold to realize economic goal ~ Second, we need to lower the fund managers＇ rational-probabilistic prediction of the value of the threshold of market supervision; Finally, we should care the threshold of the supervisor＇s prediction of fund market violations, so as to adjust supervision timely to minimize violations among fund market.

关 键 词：进化博弈 基金市场 金融监管 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学] F224.32