“奥尔森困境”的博弈分析及对我国地方政府间区域公共产品有效提供的启示  

A Game Analysis of Olson Dilemma and Its Revelation to the Effective Supply of Regional Public Goods Between Local Governments of Our Country

作　　者：樊轶侠[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经学院财政金融学院,河南郑州450011 [2]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济经纬》2009年第2期12-15,共4页Economic Survey

摘　　要：在集体选择过程中,在许多情况下,多数人未必能战胜少数人,这种情况被称为"奥尔森困境"。集体行动的决策实际上是集体内部的个体相互博弈的结果。In many cases, the majority doesn＇t necessarily surmount the minority in the course of collective selection, which is called the Olson Dilemma. The decision-making of the collective is actually the result of the games between individuals within the collective.

关 键 词：“奥尔森困境” 静态博弈 最优反应动态 区域公共产品 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]