基于挣值和关系的项目管理激励合同研究  

Study on earned-value and guanxi based incentive contract of project management

作　　者：戴春爱[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《控制与决策》2009年第4期593-597,共5页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70702025);教育部科学技术研究重点项目(105149);教育部博士点基金项目(20030614011);电子科技大学中青年学术带头人计划

摘　　要：利用基于综合业绩测度的显性合同和基于关系的隐性合同建立和求解了一个委托代理模型,分析了代理人的类型参数、项目的环境参数和关系的特征参数对项目期望业绩的影响.结果表明,如果关系存在,项目委托人将会维持这种关系.进一步,代理人能力水平的增加、风险厌恶程度的降低、项目环境的不确定性程度的降低和关系利益的增加将导致项目期望业绩上升,但项目期望业绩与关系的互惠性无关.This paper builds and solves a principal-agent model with a explicit contract based on a synthetical performance measure and an implicit guanxi-based contract, and analyzes the impacts of the parameters of agent＇ s type, project environment, and the characteristics of guanxi on the expected project performance. The results show that the project principal will maintain the guanxi if it exists. Further, an increase in the agent＇s competency, a decrease in the degree of risk aversion, a decrease in the uncertainty of the external environment of the project, and an increase in the mutual guanxi benefit result in an increase in expected project performance, but expected project performance is irrelevant to the reciprocity of the guanxi.

关 键 词：项目管理 挣值 关系 激励合同 

分 类 号：F222[经济管理—国民经济] F224