装备采办中一级密封招标的博弈均衡分析  

Analysis on Game Equilibrium of First-price-sealed Bid in Equipment Acquisition

作　　者：李晓谦[1,2] 张志峰[1] 曾华[1] 王建泰[2] 

机构地区：[1]空军工程大学导弹学院,陕西三原713800 [2]68222部队,甘肃陇西748000

出　　处：《装甲兵工程学院学报》2009年第2期17-21,共5页Journal of Academy of Armored Force Engineering

摘　　要：针对装备采办中的一级密封招标问题，分析了招标过程中的博弈特点，给出了一维贝叶斯均衡的求解方法和解析表达式，论证了在军工企业的最优战略是选择博弈的贝叶斯均衡，军方的选择是增加竞标者的人数。然后，重点分析了招标过程中的多维博弈问题，给出了多维贝叶斯均衡的一般求解方法，并针对特定的事例进行了多维均衡分析。最后，在多维博弈的框架下对一维博弈和多维博弈的均衡结果进行比较分析，结果表明：在一级密封招标过程中，多维博弈均衡是军工企业的最优战略。Aiming at the first-price-sealed bid problems in equipment acquisitions, the game characteristics of bid are analyzed, and the solution and expression of single-dimensional Bayesian equilibrium is presented. Meanwhile, the optimal strategy for military enterprises is proved to be choosing Bayesian equilibrium, and the optimal strategy for military side is to increase the number of bidders. Then, the problem of multidimensional game in first-price-sealed bid is analyzed particularly, and the general solution of multidimensional Bayesian equilibrium is given and a special case is analyzed with multidimensional Bayesian equilibrium. Finally, by comparing the results of the single-dimensional Bayesian equilibrium and multidimensional Bayesian equilibrium in the frame of multidimensional game show that multidimensional game equilibrium is the optimal strategy for military enterprises in first-price-sealed bid.

关 键 词：装备采办 多维博弈 一级密封招标 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：E257[军事—军事理论]