基础设施BOT项目中的两种政府保证研究  

Research on two kinds of government guarantees for infrastructure BOT projects

作　　者：赵立力[1] 卜祥智[2] 谭德庆[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学公共管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063 [3]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2009年第2期190-197,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：西南交通大学博士生创新基金资助项目(X1200512470102)

摘　　要：在构建了BOT项目公司同时拥有政府的产品购买保证和限制竞争保证时与政府的博弈模型基础上,进一步构建了项目公司仅有产品购买保证时的博弈模型,对两种情况下的结果进行了比较分析.比较结果表明,在项目公司同时拥有两种保证时,政府的最优保证购买量和项目公司自己的最优销量都更多,其获利也更多;政府同时给出两种保证与仅给出产品购买保证相比,前者较后者的社会消费者总剩余要少,表明政府在给出购买保证的基础上进一步给出限制竞争保证会带来社会福利的损失.This paper establishes game models under the situations that BOT （build-operate-transfer） project company has products purchase guarantee and competing restrain guarantee at the same time, and has only the competing restrain guarantee. Then, the results under the two kinds of situations are compared. The comparative resuls indicate that when the project company has these two guarantees at the same time, the products＇ purchase volume of the government is larger than that when the company has only the competing restrain guarantee, and the company can sell more prod- ucts by itself. Meanwhile, the company obtains more profits when it has two guarantees at the same time. Compared with only providing the competing restrain guarantee, the total consumer surplus decreases when government further provides the two guarantees. It means that government further provides the competing restrain guarantee on the basis of having provided the products purchase guarantee will decrease the social welfare.

关 键 词：建设-经营-移交 产品购买保证 限制竞争保证 项目公司 

分 类 号：F224.5[经济管理—国民经济]