不完全信息下选择供应链VMI合作伙伴的信息甄别模型  

Information Screening Model of Choosing VMI Cooperator in Incomplete Information

作　　者：刘德海[1] 王维国[1] 王迅[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]北京科锐配电自动化股份有限公司,北京100085

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2009年第2期47-52,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金优秀创新群体项目(70121001);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20080431145)

摘　　要：在日益开放和不断变动的市场环境中,零售商很难在为数众多的潜在的合作伙伴中,鉴别出哪些供应商的可信任程度。为了解决供应商管理库存(VMI)的战略合作伙伴关系中的信任问题,本文根据Spence的信息发送和信息甄别理论,分析了零售商设计出具有相应的信息共享和利益共享程度的最优契约方案。首先,零售商根据潜在供应商在先进的信息系统等硬件建设、提高企业员工对VMI的理解和掌握程度的技能培训等方面的可观察指标的高低,设计出最优契约方案,其规定了供应商不同的投入水平与相应的效用之间函数的关系;其次,供应商根据自己实际能力选择合适的信息系统基础设施和员工培训等投入水平,从而达到激励相容,显示出真实的可信任程度。In the increasingly open and continually changing environment, it＇s difficult for the retailer to distinguish the credit degree among the numerous potential suppliers. For resolving the credit problem in supply chain VMI strategy cooperative relationship, the paper analyzes the optimal contract projects the retailer designs, which provide the different degrees about information sharing and profit distribution, based on Spence＇ s information signaling and screening theory. Firstly, the retailer designs the optimal contract projects, which set up a f unction between the input of the supplier and its utility, based on some observable indexes of potential suppliers including the hardware building in advanced information system and skill training to improve the employee＇ s cognition and operation for the VMI. Secondly, potential suppliers choose the appropriate input into information system and employee training according to its actual ability, which is for incentive compatibility and reveals the actual dependability degree of potential suppliers.

关 键 词：供应链 供应链合作伙伴 信号发送与信息甄别 供应商管理库存 不完全信息 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]