区域经济发展中地方政府及其策略互动——一个协调博弈的分析框架  

Local Governments and Their Strategic Interactions in the Regional Economic Development:A Framework of Coordination Games

作　　者：谢思全[1] 张熇铭[1] 李泰宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院经济研究所,300071

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2008年第5期43-57,共15页Nankai Economic Studies

摘　　要：本文通过一个协调博弈的分析框架,对区域内参与协调博弈的地方政府主体的偏好、相互间的策略互动和一致性行为进行了描述,分析了区域内地方政府之间协调博弈的均衡条件以及协调失败的原因。在此基础上,本文提出了解决协调失败的对策,如建立基于地方收益增大的合作动力机制,加强地方主体之间协调互动的互惠机制,以及中央政府促进区域一体化发展的政策机制等等。Basing on the framework of coordination games, the paper describes the preference, strategic interaction,and consistant behaviors of local governments,which are participants of the coordination game. Then this article analyzes the equilibrium conditions of the coordination game between local governments and the causes of its coordination failure. Finally, the author gives suggestions about how to solve coordination failure, such as establishing cooperation mechanism aiming at increasing local benefits,mutual benefit institutions for strengthening local interactions, and policies to promote regional integration from national government.

关 键 词：协调博弈 地方政府 策略互动 区域经济发展 

分 类 号：F207[经济管理—国民经济]