论地方政府对非法煤矿实行保护主义的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of the Local Government Protectionism of Illegal Coal Mine

作　　者：李新光[1] 雷翔虎[2] 

机构地区：[1]武夷学院经济与数学系,福建武夷山354300 [2]长沙航空职业技术学院,湖南长沙410124

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2009年第4期105-107,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：地方政府在根据中央政府打击非法煤矿时,面临着"囚犯难题"的困惑,也就是说理性的地方政府导致非理性,使地方政府均为非法煤矿采取保护主义措施,那么究竟是什么原因导致地方政府对非法煤矿采取保护主义行为?文中从博弈论的角度,分析了其存在的原因,最后提出了相应的对策建议。When the local government cracks down on illegal coal mines in accordance with the central government＇s measures,they face with the confusion of ＂prisoners dilemma＂, that is to say that rationality of local government causes irrafionality,which make local governments take protectionist measures for illegal coal mine. what is the reason？ The article analyzes the reasons for them from the perspective of game theory, and ,finally ,puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.

关 键 词：地方政府 非法煤矿 保护主义 博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F127[理学—数学]