制销供应链安全责任的消费者驱动研究  

Consumer-Driving Decision of Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain

作　　者：孟炯[1,2] 唐小我[1] 倪得兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [2]西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2009年第2期52-58,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70702025);教育部科学技术研究重点项目(105149);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060614023)

摘　　要：从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品的安全性能对消费者偏好的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对消费者驱动的制销供应链安全责任决策进行了研究。结果表明:g类制销联盟较好地履行安全责任,能提高消费者对g类产品的支付意愿,从而获得较高的利润,这将对g类制销联盟进一步较好地履行安全责任产生激励驱动;若g类制销联盟未能较好地履行安全责任,消费者会用抵制购买(这种抵制行为会造成g类制销联盟的利润损失)的惩罚方式来驱动其较好地履行安全责任。g类制销联盟的最优决策是在控制成本的基础上较好地履行安全责任。本文的研究成果对供应链各成员的决策均有重要的指导意义。Starting from one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities-the product safety and its influence on the consumers,applying the basic idea of game theory,the essay studies consumer-driving decision for safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain.The results show that it can heighten consumer＇s pay desire to g product that g manufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities better,thereby achieves higher profit.The situation will incentive g manufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better further.Consumer will drive g manufacturer-retailer alliance to fulfill safety responsibilities better with punishing ways if g manufacturer-retailer alliance fulfills safety responsibilities badly,the punishing ways come from consumer＇s boycott,which will make g manufacturer-retailer alliance a loss of profits.The perfect decision of g manufacturer-retailer alliance is fulfilling safety responsibilities better on the basis of controlling cost.The study will provide avaluable guidance to the decision of supply chain.

关 键 词：制销供应链联盟 利润分配 安全责任 消费者驱动 博弈论 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]