计及网络约束的激励性电力市场竞价机制设计  

Design of Incentive Bidding Mechanism on Electricity Market With Network Constraints Considered

作　　者：杨光[1] 俞集辉[1] 张谦[1] 杨越[1] 何健[1] 

机构地区：[1]输配电装备及系统安全与新技术国家重点实验室(重庆大学),重庆市沙坪坝区400030

出　　处：《电网技术》2009年第9期90-96,共7页Power System Technology

基　　金：重庆市自然科学基金项目(CSTC;2006BB3213)

摘　　要：根据机制设计理论,设计了一种具有激励相容特性的电力竞价机制。该机制考虑了网络约束的影响,解决了在实际应用时难以计算的问题,并能有效地激励发电商上报真实成本,实现社会资源的合理配置。文章以IEEE-14节点网络为算例进行仿真分析,结果表明该机制可抑制发电商的市场力,节约购电成本,稳定电价,有利于实现社会资源的优化配置。According to mechanism design theory, a power bidding mechanism existing incentive and compatibility features is designed. The designed mechanism considers the influence of network constraints, solves the problems which are hard to be calculated in practical application, and can motivate the power plants reporting their true costs to upper department to realize reasonable allocation of social resources. Taking IEEE 14-bus system for calculation example, the designed bidding mechanism is simulated. Simulation results show that the designed bidding mechanism can suppress market power, save electricity purchase cost, stabilize electricity price, so it is favorable to optimal allocation of social resources.

关 键 词：机制设计理论 显示原理 激励相容 信息补偿 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]