中国大飞机项目决策过程的动态博弈分析--兼论创新型国家发展战略  

Game Theory Analysis of Decision-making Process in China's Large Aircraft Projects——Simultaneous Discussion on Innovative Country Development Strategy

作　　者：景崇毅[1] 石丽娜[2] 孙宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国民航飞行学院航空运输管理学院,四川广汉618307 [2]上海工程技术大学飞行学院,上海201620

出　　处：《工业工程》2009年第2期14-18,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60776820);中国民航飞行学院自然科学基金资助项目(J2008-28)

摘　　要：以博弈论的观点,利用改进过的阻截垄断模型对中国大飞机项目决策过程进行动态模拟,采用逆向归纳法分析该不完全信息动态博弈的均衡解。结果显示波音-空客的优策略是阻断-Cournot亚博弈策略,第1阶段的威胁不可置信,第2阶段的打击策略并不会增加垄断者的收益;中方的优策略是进入-坚持,原因是中方的效用函数中引入了"产业结构"变量,即技术扩散效应下的产业链优化升级,双方的关注点差异是导致博弈结局不同于传统阻截垄断博弈结局的重要原因。对博弈结论进行了扩展,简要论述了大飞机项目所映射出的我国新时期国家发展战略思想——创新型国家发展战略,并对后续研究进行了一定展望。Based on game theory, an improved ＂b｜ocking monopoly model＂ was used to dynamically stimulate the decision-making process in China＇ s large aircraft projects, and its equilibrium solution was analyzed with backward induction. The result showed that the best strategy for Boeing-Airbus is that of counterwork and Cournot sub-game; the threat of first stage is unbelievable and the strike strategy of the second stage can not increase the monopoly＇ s earnings ; China has the entering-insisting strategy, because of the introduction of the ＂industry structure＂ variable into the utility function, namely, the optimization and up- dating of industry chains under technology diffusion effects. The different concerns of both sides led to game results which differed from the traditional ones. The game conclusion was extended, and the develop- ment strategy of our country in the new era was briefly discussed, as reflected in the large aircraft projects--the country＇s innovative development strategy. Some suggestions were proposed for subsequent study.

关 键 词：大飞机 阻截垄断模型 博弈 创新型国家发展战略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F562