存货质押业务中银行对物流企业的最优激励契约  

Bank's Optimal Incentive Contracts with Logistics Enterprises in Inventory Financing

作　　者：周钊[1] 王勇[1] 徐鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《工业工程》2009年第2期29-32,共4页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572028);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(05JA630063)

摘　　要：考虑了银行将观测的n个其他物流企业参与存货质押业务业绩的均值写入激励合同,从对称信息、非对称信息和非对称信息下增加其他可测变量3个方面,分析了银行对物流企业的激励,得出结论:当其他物流企业业绩的均值与外生不确定性因素相关时,随着n的增加,代理成本不断减少,物流企业的努力水平不断提高;产出与其他物流企业业绩的均值相关程度越高,银行的期望收益越大。In view of the fact that the average performance of other logistic corporations are being added to incentive contracts, bank＇s incentive mechanism was analyzed from three aspects：symmetric information, asymmetric information and other measurable variables added in the situation of asymmetric information. The conclusion was that when the average performance of other logistic corporations are correlated with some uncertain factors, the cost of agency continues to reduce with the increase of measurable variables, and the degree to which a logistic corporation exerts itself gets higher. The higher the correlativity between outputs and the average of other logistic corporations＇ performance, the greater the expected profit of the bank.

关 键 词：存货质押 委托代理 激励契约 物流企业 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]