基于垂直市场结构的三国反倾销税率模型研究  

AN ANALYSIS ON THE THREE-COUNTRY MODEL OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTY RATE UNDER VERTICAL MARKET STRUCTURE

作　　者：郭竞男[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《陕西科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2009年第2期156-161,共6页Journal of Shaanxi University of Science & Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：随着国际贸易自由化程度不断提高以及关税壁垒的削减,许多国家纷纷转向利用反倾销等非关税壁垒来保护本国产业.在垂直市场结构条件下,并在国内外市场三方企业进行完全信息同时博弈的假设下,利用博弈的逆向归纳法,建立了在国内社会福利最大化条件下的国内政府对国外企业所适用的最优反倾销税率模型,并得出了相应的模型分析结果:国内政府所适用的反倾销税率受东道国市场容量和三方国家国内上下游生产企业各自的生产成本等因素的影响.结论对国内政府征收反倾销税率具有一定的理论指导意义.So profound goes the trade liberalization that tariff barriers have been cut off, a large number of countries are inclined to use anti-dumping as an efficient way of non-tariff barriers to protect domestic industries. Under vertical market structure and based on the assumption of perfect information when enterprises from the three countries are gaming at the domestic market, this paper, by employing the methodology of reverse induction, establishes a model on anti-dumping duty rates to analyze how domestic government imposes antidumping duty rates on different enterprises from different countries. Conclusions are drawn according to the results of the model： the optimized anti-dumping duty rates are restricted by the scale of domestic market and the costs of enterprises in all involving countries, whether the upstream enterprises or the downstream ones. These conclusions can put forward some strategic suggestions for domestic government on how to impose anti-dumping duty rates on imported goods.

关 键 词：反倾销税率 垂直市场结构 完全信息 国内社会福利 逆向归纳法 

分 类 号：F742[经济管理—国际贸易]