基于信号传递模型的劳动力市场就业行为分析  

The Analysis of Employment in Job-market Based on Signaling Model

作　　者：丁越兰[1] 罗瑞强[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,西安710062

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第3期66-70,共5页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：通过建立信号传递博弈模型,分析了不完全信息下求职者的受教育行为。在使自身效用最大化的前提下,不同求职者能力类型之间相差越小,高潜质求职者越倾向选择比完全信息均衡条件下更高的教育水平。结果导致了市场上求职者的受教育程度不断提高,并在某种程度上出现了过度教育的趋向。根据分析结果,本文提出了增加专用性投资,实行培训生制度,改变求职方向等一系列措施来改进市场效率。Using signaling game model, this paper discusses how job seekers of diverse types choose different levels of education under the condition of incomplete job-market information. To maximize their utilities, job seekers with higher ability demand more education than those who own lower ability especially in the case they exceed others a little. As it goes on, the job seekers＇ degree will keep rising and the educational signal they delivered is over signaling to some extent. At last the paper advances some measures for betterment such as increasing special investment, generalizing trainee program, alternating the target position to promote the market efficiency.

关 键 词：信号传递 分离均衡 混同均衡 过度教育信号 

分 类 号：F241.2[经济管理—劳动经济]