规制俘获理论述评  

A Theory of Regulation Capture:Review

作　　者：倪子靖[1] 史晋川[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院经济学系博士研究生 [2]浙江大学经济学院,杭州310027

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2009年第5期99-106,共8页Zhejiang Social Sciences

摘　　要：规制俘获理论彻底批判了早先的公共利益理论,重新阐释了政府实行规制的目的,明确了政治供给和政治需求的相互联系;并且分析了在规制俘获过程中,利益集团的行为和政府规制者的反应;此外,规制俘获理论也计量和测度了出现规制俘获而造成的社会福利损失;更有意义的是,学者们正在从契约和组织构建等角度,尝试设计一系列阻止规制俘获发生的组织机制。The theory of regulation capture criticizes the public interest theory completely,and then illuminates the order of government regulation again.It points out the relation between the 'supply side' and the 'demand side' of political decision,with analyzing the action of interest groups and the response of regulatory institutions.Besides,the theory measures the loss of social welfare in the process of regulatory capture.Moreover,economists are trying to design a series of institutional mechanism to prevent the regulatory capture occurrence.

关 键 词：规制俘获 规制经济学 寻租理论 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]