基于上下游的完全信息动态博弈反倾销模型  

Anti-Dumping Model by Dynamic Game Analysis with Perfect Information Based On Upstream and Downstream Monopoly Market Structure

作　　者：王婷婷[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《贵州工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2008年第5期146-149,共4页Journal of Guizhou University of Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70673061)

摘　　要：根据我国某些垄断行业的真实情况,基于上下游均为垄断企业的市场结构和本国市场的斯塔克伯格均衡,运用逆向归纳法解出社会福利最大化时的最优反倾销税率,并分析了最优反倾销税率的决定因素及这些因素对社会福利的影响。得出结论认为最优税率受市场容量,国内上下游垄断企业和国外上下游垄断企业的市场竞争力的影响。According to the real situation of some monopoly industries in China, this paper establishes a dynamic game model with perfect information based on upstream and downstream monopoly market structure and Stackelberg model used in domestic market, meanwhile employs backward induction solution to solve the equilibrium and get the optimal anti - dumping tax rate. It analyzes factors that influence the optimal rate and how they impact on the social welfare. Conclusion can be drawn that the optimal rate will be influenced by market size, enterprise competitiveness of domestic upstream and downstream monopolies and foreign ones.

关 键 词：反倾销税率 完全信息动态博弈 上下游垄断市场结构 斯塔克伯格模型 逆向归纳法 

分 类 号：TP391[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]