供应商一级密封报价博弈模型研究  

Bidding game model of suppliers based on first-price sealed auction

作　　者：卓翔芝[1,2] 王旭[1] 代应[1] 王永宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学,重庆400030 [2]淮北煤炭师范学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2009年第15期213-215,共3页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：国家科技攻关计划专题(No.2006BAH02A09)

摘　　要：在一个复杂的供应链系统中,由于供应商之间信息保密,那么供应商之间将会出现不完全信息竞争博弈。基于一级密封拍卖方式与供应链中供应商的投标报价的相似性,利用一级密封拍卖模型对供应商的竞争报价进行了研究,建立了供应商报价博弈模型,得到供应商的最优报价策略,定量地解决了报价中的信息不完全的问题,为供应商的报价决策提供参考。In a complex supply chain system,because of confidential information between vendors,then there will be between suppliers incomplete information competition game.Based on the similarity between the first-price sealed auction and the suppliers＇ bidding of the supply chain,this paper studies the suppliers＇ competitive bidding by using the first-price sealed auction model.The suppliers＇ bidding game model is established,and the optimal bidding strategies of the vendors are gained.It resolves quantificationally the problem of the bidding in the incomplete information,and provides reference for decision-making bid to the vendors.

关 键 词：一级密封价格拍卖 供应商 报价博弈模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]