基于讨价还价博弈下的供应链回购合同研究  

Research on Supply Chain Buyback Contracts Based on Bargaining Game

作　　者：李娟[1] 黄培清[1] 骆建文[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第2期55-59,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802041;70772065;70732003)

摘　　要：分析了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的系统。不确定性需求实现之后,系统成员能够对交易合同参数进行讨价还价,从而确定双方之间的收益分配比例。研究得出,首先,相对于分散控制系统,基于讨价还价下的分散控制系统中,成员之间讨价还价会对供应商收益产生负面影响;而对于供应链系统和零售商而言,收益变化趋势取决于双方之间的讨价还价能力的大小。其次,相对于回购控制系统中,在对回购价格进行讨价还价的回购控制系统中,供应商和零售商在期初所签订的回购合同具有抗讨价还价性;而在对批发价格进行讨价还价的回购控制系统中,回购合同是否具有抗讨价还价性,取决于零售商和供应商之间的相对谈判权利。A supply chain constructed by a supplier and a retailer is analyzed. After uncertainty demand is realized, the members of the supply chain can bargain over contracts, which are underwritten in the beginning period, in order to reallocate the sum of profit. Firstly comparing to under the decentralized system, under the decentralized system based on bargaining game, bargaining power can reduce the supplier＇s profit, the system＇s and the retailer＇s profit fluctuating trend depends on the magnitude of bargaining. Secondly comparing to under the buyhack system, under the buyback system based on bargaining game, if the buyback price of product is bargained, the buyback contracts underwritten in the beginning period are bargaining-proof; if the wholesale price of product is bargained, whether the buyback contracts are bargaining-proof lies on the magnitude of bargaining power.

关 键 词：供应链 讨价还价 回购合同 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]