政府隐性保险政策与银行业风险承担行为——对“国家信用悖论”的理论解释  

Government Implicit Insurance Policy and the Risk-taking Behavior of Banking:Theoretic Explanation for the Paradox of National Credit

作　　者：许友传[1] 何佳[2] 王灵芝[3] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学金融研究院,上海200433 [2]香港中文大学工商管理学院 [3]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第2期60-64,43,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文在一个两期经济的框架内,研究了国家隐性保险对银行业风险承担行为的影响,给出了隐性保险对不同银行风险选择的激励条件和边界,并对基于政府隐性保险的"国家信用悖论"给予了理论解释。政府隐性保险并不必然鼓励所有银行的风险承担行为,它只是可能地鼓励了问题银行的风险承担激励。政府隐性保险对问题银行的风险承担激励取决于银行自身的资本充足状况和实体经济的微观基础。当实体经济缺乏竞争性的微观基础时,政府隐性保险越有可能鼓励了问题银行的整体性风险承担行为。The paper studies the effects of government implicit insurance on risk-taking behavior of banking at a two-stage economy. We respectively give the incentive conditions and interiors of risk choice of different bunks under implicit insurance policy and a particular theoretic explanation for the paradox of national credit. The implicit insurance policy doesn＇t necessary induces the risk-taking incentive of all banks, but possibly encourages the risk-taking incentive of unhealthy banks that largely depends on the conditions of asset-liability or capita/ adequacy of them and the corresponding micro-foundation of real economy. It more possibly encourages the wholly risk-taking incentive of unhealthy banks when the real economy runs short of the competitive micro-foundation.

关 键 词：隐性保险 市场约束 道德风险 风险承担行为 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学]