不同风险偏好的过度自信代理人薪酬合同设计  

Compensation Contract Design for Overconfident Agent with Different Risk Preference

作　　者：张征争[1] 黄登仕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第2期104-110,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572089)

摘　　要：本文将过度自信心理特征纳入到经典委托代理框架,从代理人过度自信程度、代理人的风险偏好、努力-产出不确定性、努力可观测性、保留效用几个角度,构建了多个不同的委托代理情景,分别分析了委托人提供不同形式合同、代理人付出不同努力水平时他们的期望效用,从而考察在各种情景下委托人应怎样为不同类型代理人设计薪酬合同,激励代理人付出努力,以实现委托人和代理人决策组合的帕雷托最优。结果表明,对不同过度自信程度及风险偏好的代理人,委托人提供的合同形式大不相同。这不仅从行为的角度拓展了经典委托代理框架,而且为委托人设计薪酬合同提供了非常有益的参考。This paper brings overconfidence into classic principal-agent frame, and designs several situations from different points such as overconfidence degree, risk preference, effort-output uncertainty, effort observability and reservation utility. The paper analyzes principal and agent＇s expected utilities when both the form of contract and effort level is different. So it can investigate how the principals should design compensation contract for agent to inspire them work hard and then achieve Pareto dominance of decision combination in various situations. The results indicate that the forms of compensation contract principal offers vary distinctly for agents with different overconfidence degree and different risk preference. As a result, it will not only expand classic principal-agent frame but also make helpful suggestions for principals to design compensation contract.

关 键 词：过度自信 风险偏好 薪酬合同 

分 类 号：F069.9[经济管理—政治经济学]