资产属性、联盟冲突与独资化趋势  

Property Attribute,Alliance Conflicts and the Trend of Solely Ownership

作　　者：李国范[1] 赵增耀[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学商学院

出　　处：《世界经济研究》2009年第5期59-64,共6页World Economy Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"中外合资企业外资控股独资趋势的发生机理;影响及应对策略研究"(项目号:70473064);国家自然科学基金项目"FDI主导的产业集群中当地企业的进入障碍;升级困境及其突破研究"(项目号:70773079)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在20世纪末独资化已成趋势的中国大背景下,作者引入内生交易费用经济学机会主义和不完全契约的假定,从专用性资产的套牢效应和专有性资产的溢出效应导致联盟冲突的角度,对中国电梯工业的合资独资案例进行研究,研究表明,资产属性导致联盟内生冲突是跨国公司在中国独资化的本质原因。最后,作者给出强势联盟和异质联盟是保持合资企业相对稳定的治理结构的原创性建议。The author makes a case study on Chinese elevator industry's joint venture and solely ownership,from the respect of the conflicts within alliances generated by the hold-up effect of specific assets and the leakage effect of proprietary assets.As solely ownership has become the major trend at the end of 20th century,the author introduces assumptions from the opportunism economics theory on 'endogenous transaction cost' and the theory of incomplete contract.The author finds out that the intrinsic conflict within alliances led by asset properties is the essential cause of the trend of MNCs' solely ownership.Finally the author pointed out his original idea that stronger alliances and heterogeneous alliances may maintain a stable structure of management.

关 键 词：内生交易费用 机会主义 专用性资产 可占用性准租 套牢效应 

分 类 号：F832.6[经济管理—金融学] F279.2