论国有银行制度变迁中政府效用函数的动态优化  

The analysis on government's utility function dynamic optimization during the State-owned banking system changes

作　　者：武艳杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2009年第2期152-155,163,共5页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：国有银行产权的特殊性决定了政府收益最大化是其制度变迁中的最主要制约因素,政府追求的目标函数具有动态优化的特征,最大化的实现取决于租金收益与税收收益的最优组合。由于中央政府追求目标的多元化、地方政府利益以及政治银行家的个人效用等原因,国有银行制度变迁具有滞后性的特征。国有银行自身效用最大化的实现最终取决于政府与政治银行家的利益达成一致,以及外部环境的建设。The special nature of the property rights of state-owned banks has been decided to maximize the government's processcon is its most important institutional constraints.The Government's objective function has the characteristics of dynamic optimization,and the realization of government's proceeds depends on the best combination of rental income with tax income.As the central government pursues many goals,in the mcan time local governments and the political bankers have their own interests,the state-owned banking system reform has lagged behind.The ultimate realization of the State-owned banks' proceeds depends on whether the interests between the government and the political bankers agree,or the external environment of the building does not.

关 键 词：国有银行 制度变迁 政府效用函数 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]