股权制衡与公司投资——一个委托代理模型  

A Model of Ownership Control and Corporate Investment

作　　者：曹书军[1] 刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,四川重庆400044

出　　处：《预测》2009年第3期65-70,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100;70802067);国家社会科学基金资助项目(08XJY032);教育部博士点基金资助项目(教技发中心函(2006)226号);重庆市科委软科学基金资助项目(CSTC;2008CE9042)

摘　　要：在过去10年里,人们逐渐关注存在多个大股东的制衡型股权结构对公司行为和价值的影响。本文构造了一个委托代理模型来刻画监督股东如何通过合约的设计来影响控股股东的股权比例选择和投资行为。本文发现存在控股比例上限,而当信息不对称时,控股股东的最优持股比取决于控股股东的努力的边际产出和边际成本之比,资本的边际产出则较低,而监督股东的监督成本则与控股股东的私人收益有关。In the past decade, more researches are gathered on the effect of ownership structure, especially when there exists multiple shareholders. This paper conceives a principle-agency model to describe the behavior of both the monitoring and controlling shareholder. We detail the contract with witch the agency-controlling shareholder would chose the optimal effort and investment. We get the upper line of the control share, and with moral hazard, there is a lower marginal output of capital, and the optimal structure is associated with marginal output and marginal cost of effort, the monitoring cost is associated with the private benefit of controlling shareholder.

关 键 词：股权制衡 公司投资 道德风险 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]